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THE DUAL REGULATION OF COMMERCE
UNDER THE AMENDED THIRTEENTH SECTION OF THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE.
The regulation of railroad rates by the various states began
with railroad transportation. At the outset the railroads were
granted charters by the states, and in many instances these
charters prescribed maximum rates for freight or passenger
transportation, or both.1 The general practice was to allow the
board of directors to fix certain rates within their discretion,
tho in many instances this discretion was made subject to a
limitation upon the amount of net earnings. 2 Some of the states
enacted laws setting out maximum rates and reserving, to the
state, the power to alter rates.3 Even tho the legislation first imposed by the states upon the railroads was not, as a general
rule, burdensome or unreasonable yet it was significant of the
state's right to control.
Pursuant to the authority conferred upon a committee by
the United States Senate, to make a thorough investigation of
railroad regulation, an elaborate report was fied and thus Congress, thru the activities of this committee, became more intimately acquainted with the development of railroad transportation, and with the exercise of the ratemaking power of the states;
the result was the Act to Regulate Commerce enacted in 1887. 4
The fact that beyond the bounds of state control there was a
vast field of unregulated activity lay the principal demand for
IMd. Laws of 1826, chapt. 123, sec. 18; 1830 chapt. 117, see. 2, 3;
1834 chapt. 281, sec. 3. Mass. Laws of 1829 chapt. 26, see. 6; 1830 chapt.
93, sec. 10. New York Laws of 1828, chapt. 21, sec. 11; chapt. 238, see.
11; 1831 chapt. 83, sec. 10; 1836 chapt. 243, sec. 9; Virginia Laws of
1830, 1831 chapt. 119, sec. 19; chapt. 121, sec. 18; 1835, 1836, chapt. 121,
sec. 24. Ohio Laws of 1833, 1834 p. 203, see. 19, p. 296, sec. 9. N. Carolina Laws 1836, 1837 chapt. 40, sec. 30.
2Conn. 1832, 11. Resolves and Private Laws (1789-1836) p. 992.
Ind. Laws 1832 chapt. 146, sec. 23, 24. Fla. Laws 1848 chapt. 244, sec.
11. N. Y. Laws 1828, chapt. 304, see. 13; 1832 chapt. 162, sec. 12; Mass.
Laws 1833 chapt. 118, sec. 4; Va. Laws 1839 chapt. 110, sec. 5; Laws
Wisconsin 1847 p. 72, see. 15; 1851 chapt. 262, sec. 7.
3 Ill. Laws 1849 p. 15, sec. 21, 32; Mass. Laws 1845 chapt. 191, see.
2, 1860 chapt. 201, sec. 2; N. Y. Laws 1850 chapt. 140, see. 33; Cal.
Laws, 1850 chapt. 128, sec. 77, 1861 chapt. 532, sec. 51; Iowa Code 1873
sec. 305; Iowa Laws 1874 chapt. 68, sec. 1-5; Report of Industrial
Commission 1901 vol. 9, p. 903-905, 911-915.
124 Stat. at L. 379, Chapt. 104; U. S. C. A. Title 49.
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Federal action. Congress carefully defined the scope of its
regulation, and expressly provided that it was not to extend into
intrastate commerce. Thus Congress, under the dominant 6peration of the Constitution, entered the field of commerce in the
regulation of interstate traffic, and the establishment of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
It is my intention to discuss the regulation of the transportation of persons and property or both, by the various states
and the Interstate Commerce Commission under the amended
13th section of the Act to Regulate Commerce, supra, in those
instances where a discrimination has been found to result from
the disparity between Federal and state rates. To pronote a
more thorough understanding, the subject will be divided into
three parts:
1. Dual regulation of commerce prior to the Transportation Act of
1920.

2. That part of the Transportation Act of 1920 amending section 13
of the Act to Regulate Commerce.
3.

Dual regulation subsequent to the Transportation Act of 1920.

1. Dual Regulation of Commerce Prior to the Transportation
Act of 1920.
The dual regulation of commerce affords a very interesting
and novel question, as well as one of the most complex in the
field of transportation today. The United States Supreme Court
has fhrmly established the principle that where the inevitable
effect of the state's requirements for intrastate transportation
is to create an unjust discrimination between points in the same
and those in adjoining states, the intrastate rate must yield to
the paramount power of the Federal government over interstate commerce to the extent that it amounts to a discrimination
against such commerce. A forerunner of this principle appeared
in the case of Simpson v. 8Shepard, styled the Minnesota Rate
Cases,5 which arose prior to the Transportation Act, and involved the question as to whether or not certain intrastate rates
were discriminatory. There the state of Minnesota had established rates for intrastate transportation, throughout the state,
and the complaining carriers insisted that by reason of the
passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce the state could no
6 230 U. S. 431, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, 48 L. R. A. N.
S.1151.

KENTUCKY LAw Jouum.
longer exercise the statewide authority that it had formerly
enjoyed in prescribing reasonable intrastate rates, and that
the scheme of rates which Minnesota had prescribed, otherwise
validly established, was null and void because of their injurious
effect on .interstate commerce. Thus the question under discussion was presented, but was reserved because there had been
no finding of unjust discrimination by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Hughes,
stated:
. ....
.and the question whether the carrier, in such a case,
was giving an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to one
locality as against another, or subjecting one locality to an undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, would be primarily for the
investigation and determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The dominating purpose of the statute was to secure conformity
to the prescribed standards thru the examination and appreciation of
the complex facts of transportation by the body created for that purpose; and, as this Court has repeatedly held, it would be destructive
of the system of regulation defined by the statute if the Court, without
the preliminary action of the Commission, were to undertake to pass
upon the administrative questions which the statute has primarily
confided to it .......
In the present case there has been no finding
by the Interstate Commerce Commission of unjust discrimination violative of the Act; and no action of that body is before us for review."

It was also urged that the questions presented would permit
section 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, prohibiting carriers
from giving an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any locality, to apply to an unreasonable discrimination between localities in different states, as well when arising from
an intrastate rate as compared with an interstate rate as when
due to interstate rates exclusively. The Court ruled that even
if the statute should be so construed, there should first be an
investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission as to
whether or not a discrimination existed and the absence of such
an investigation precluded the Court from placing any construction on that phase of section 3.
The extent of Federal control over intrastate rates, established by the United States Supreme Court, can best be understood from the discussion, by that Court, in what is known as
the Skhreveport Case.6
"Whatwas lacking in the Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, was
0

Ho&ston E. and W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 58 IA.
Ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833.
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here supplied for the Interstate Commission had found that an
unjust discrimination had arisen out of the relation of interstate and intrastate rates. The case was one brought by certain
railway companies seeking to set aside the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, fixing a reasonable interstate rate and
ordering the carriers to desist from charging any higher rates
for the interstate haul than were charged for intrastate hauls.
The validity of this order was challenged upon two grounds:
(1) that Congress is impotent to control the intrastate rates of
an interstate carrier, even to the extent necessary to prevent
injurious discrimination to interstate traffic, and (2) that if
it be assumed that Congress had this power, it had not been
exercised and hence the commission exceeded the limits of the
authority conferred upon it. In answer to the aforesaid objections, and in as few words as possible, the Shreveport case held
that under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Congress
had sufficient power to prevent the common instrumentalities of
interstate and intrastate commerce from being used in their
intrastate operation in such a manner as to injuriously affect
interstate commerce; where an unjust discrimination against
interstate commerce arises out of the relation of interstate to
intrastate rates the power of Congress may be exerted to remove
the discrimination. In correcting such discrimination Congress
is not restricted to an adjustment of the interstate rates, but
may prescribe a reasonable standard to which they shall conform
and require the carrier to adjust the intrastate rates in such a
manner as to remove the discrimination, for where there is a
disparity it is for Congress and not the State to prescribe the
dominant rule. It is permissible for Congress to provide for
the execution of this power thru a subordinate body, such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and this has been done by the
Act to Regulate Commerce. Finally, if the Interstate Commerce
Commission, in the exercise of its delegated authority, finds a
discrimination resulting from an inequality in the two classes
of rates, it may determine what are reasonable rates, and the
carrier may not only put the interstate rates, found to be reasonable, into effect, but may remove the discrimination by bringing
the intrastate rates to the same level
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The second contention was answered by the Court as follows:
"The remaining question is with regard to the scope of the power
which Congress ihas granted to the Commission. Section 3 of the Act
to Regulate Commerce provides (24 Stat. at L. 379, 380, Chapt. 104;
Comp. Stat. seclions S563, 8565; 4 Fed. Stat. Anne. 2nd Ed. pp. 337,
379): 'Section 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to make or give an undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, firm,
company, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of
traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person,
firm, company, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of
traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever.' This language is certainly sweeping enough to
embrace all the discriminations of the sort described, which is within
the power of Congress to condemn. There is no exception or qualification with respect to an unreasonable discrimination against interstate
traffic, produced by the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as
maintained by the carrier. It is apparent from the legislative history
of the act that the evil of discrimination was the principle thing aimed
at, and there is no basis for the contention that Congress intended to
exempt any discriminatory action or practice of interstate carriers
affecting interstate commerce which it had authority to reach. The
purpose of the measure was thus emphatically stated in the elaborate
report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce which accompanied it: 'The provisions of the bill are based upon the theory that
the paramount evil chargeable against the operation of the transportation system of the United States as now conducted is unjust discrimination between persons, places, commodities, or particular descriptions
of traffic. The underlying purpose and aim of the measure is the
prevention of these discriminations.'
(Senate Report No. 46, 49th
Cong. 1st Sess. p. 215)."

Thus the Shreveport case held that the Interstate Commerce
Commission, as the agent of Congress, had not only the power to
determine whether or not a discrimination existed, but could remove the discrimination by providing a reasonable interstate
rate and allowing the carrier to bring the intrastate rate to the
one prescribed by the Commission.
The case of Illinois Central Railway Co. v. Public Utilities
Commissian, likewise presented a controversy over the validity,
scope, and effect of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dealing with discriminations found to result from a disparity in interstate and intrastate rates. Here the order of the
Commission was held invalid on the ground of uncertainty because the rates prescribed stated no definite field of operation.
This uncertainty arose out of a failure to designate with appropriate decision the points to and from which the interstate rates
T245 U. S. 493-62 L. Ed. 425 (1918).
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must or may be adjusted. However the same principles that
have been set out in the foregoing cases were reiterated and
sustained, the Court holding that Congress could and did invest
the Interstate Commerce Commission with power to remove an
existing discrimination against interstate commerce by directing
a change in intrastate rates. Also see American Express Co. v.
8o11th Dakota,s
It should be remembered that those principles set out in the
foregoing cases were established prior to the enactment of the
Transportation Act of 1920. By this Act Congress legislated
on the foregoing principles and, with one exception, directly
conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission that
authority already reposed in it under the decisions of the
Supreme Court. The exception was the added power to directly
remove a discrimination when established in a proper proceeding before the Commission.
2. That part of the TransportationAct of 1920 amending section 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce.
That part of the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. at L.
456) amending section 13 of the Act to Regulate Commerce (24
Stat. at L. 383, Chapt. 104; Comp. Stat. see. 8581; 4 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 2nd. Ed. page 453) is, as I have stated, the application of
those principles set out in the foregoing cases. This Act gives
to the Interstate Commerce Commission additional power that
it did not have under those decisions of the Supreme Court:
mainly, under those decisions previously set out, the only power
the Commission had, in fixing intrastate rates, was to condemn
and enjoin the state rates from time to time until they finally
reached the level which, in the judgment of the Commission,
afforded no discrimination. Under the Transportation Act this
power was extended, and authority was conferred -apon the Commission to directly remove any discrimination in a proper proceeding before that body. Thus Congress enacted express provisions in respect to intrastate rates, regulations, and practices.
There is need to discuss only those two amendments to section 13, which, for the first time, authorized the Commission to
deal directly with intrastate rates where they were unduly discriminatory against interstate commerce. However to make
8244 U. S. 616, 61 L. Ed. 1352-37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656.
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more fully understood the two amendments under consideration
I might add that another, and an important, feature of the Act
requires the Commission to so prescribe rates as to enable the
carriers as a whole, or in groups selected by the Commission, to
earn an aggregate annual net railway operating income equal
to a fair return on the aggregate value of the railway property
used in transportation. This amendment was styled section 15a
(U. S. C. A. Title 49 sec. 15a). The "dovetail relation" between the amendments to section 13 and section 15a can easily
be seen. If the purpose of section 15a is interfered with by a
disparity in the two classes of rates, then the Commission under
the amendments to section 13 is authorized to remove it by removing the disparity. Thus the authority granted by amendment styled 4 to section 13 is to be considered in the light of the
affirmative duty of the Commission to fix rates, and to maintain
an adequate system of national railways. As intrastate rates, and
the income from them, must play an important part in maintaining such a system, the effective operation of the Act requires
that intrastate rates should pay "a fair proportionate share of
the cost of maintenance." If there is interference with the
accomplishment of the purpose of Congress because of a disparity between intrastate rates and interstate rates, the Commission is authorized to remove it.
Under the amendments to section 13, paragraphs 3 and 4,
Congress authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to
"cause the state or states interested to be notified of the proceedings," and to confer with state regulatory bodies with respect to "the relationship between rates, structures, and practices of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of such state bodies,
and of the Commission," and to hold joint hearings. It was
further provided that if, in any such investigation, after full
hearing, the Commission finds that "any such rate, fare, charge,
classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand, and
interstate commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful,
"the Commission shall prescribe the rate, regulation, or practice" thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judg-
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ment, will remove "the discrimination." The orders of the Commission are to bind the carriers, parties to the proceeding, "the
law of any state or the decision or order of any state authority
to the contrary notwithstanding."
There can be no doubt but that Congress intended to recognize and incorporate in legislative enactment the rule laid down
in the Shreveport case, supra. This is emphatically true in the
light of the presentment of the amendments to the House and
to the Senate. Mr. Esch, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced the amendments to the
House, and said:
"We also provide for the enactment into law of what is properly
known as the decision of the Supreme Court in the Shreveport case. 9
Senator Cuimmins of the Committe on Interstate Commerce, in
the Senate, -went into a more detailed discussion:
"The Committee has attempted simply to express the decisions of
the Supreme Court. (Shreveport case) We have not attempted to
carry the authority of Congress beyond the exact point ruled by the
Supreme Court in the cases in which I refer; and the only thing we
have done in the matter has been to confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the authority to remove the discrimination when
established in a proper proceeding before that body-an authority
which it does not now have
"The Supreme Court held that Congress had not conferred upon
the Interstate Commerce Commission the right to prescribe a rate in
the stead of one which had been condemned; but so far as the condemnation of the rates is concerned, the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission is already ample, and it has succeeded in one way
or another in removing the discriminations which have come under
its notice without the statute which we now produce."'"

The preceding older sections of section 13 deal with investigation initiated by any person, firm, or corporation, or by
a railroad commission, or the Interstate Commerce Commission
itself. Under amendment 3 of section 13 the carriers are
authorized to invoke an investigation by the Commission by
bringing into issue any intrastate rates made or imposed by the
authority of any state, and the Commission was authorized to
confer with the interested regulatory bodies, and to hold joint
hearings."
' Cong. Rec. 66 Cong. 1st Sess. vol. 58, part 8, page 8317.
Cong. Rec. 66, Cong. vol. 59 part 1, pages 142, 143.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Railway
Co. 39 Federal (2nd) 508.
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In every exercise of interference by the Interstate Commerce Commission with state functions the procedure required
by amendment 4, to section 13, must be followed. One of the
things required is that there be a "full hearing." If discrimination in state rates be found substantial enough to require removal, the question must then always arise whether the state
rate or the interstate rate is unreasonable and should be altered.
A previous establishing of interstate rate as reasonable will not
settle the question because the representatives of the state, or
states, interested are entitled to a "full hearing" on the question
relative to reasonableness. The section (4) contemplates particular situations under conditions then existing, under a full,
formal hearing, and authorized 'interference with state rates
only where there is disclosed a present, real, and substantial
discrimination, or other specific detriment, against interstate
commerce. If the Commission finds a discrimination to exist,
then there is one of four things to be done: (1) To make a fixed
rate, (2) to make a maximum rate, (3) to make a minimum rate,
and (4) to fix both a minimum and a maximum rate. The Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to do any one of these
four things in order to remove the discrimination.1 2
3. Dual Regulations subsequent to the Transportation Act of
1920.
The first case to arise subsequent to the enactment of the
Transportation Act, amending section 13, was that of Railroad
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy
Railroad Co.13 The proceedings in that case grew out of what
is known as the Wisconsin PassengerFares,begun in an investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission under paragraphs 3 and 4 of section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as
amended by the Transportation Act, into an alleged undue and'
unreasonable discrimination against interstate commerce arising
out of intrastate rates in Wisconsin.
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress, in the exercise of
its control over interstate commerce, could impower the Interstate Commerce Commission to remove a discrimination against
interstate commerce involved in a general disparity between in" State of Florida v. United States. 30 Federal (2nd) 116; Georgia

Public Service C&onmision v. United States. 30 Federal (2nd) 167.
'Reported in 257 U. S. 563; 63 L. Ed. 371.
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terstate and intrastate passenger rates by ordering a statewide
increase of intrastate rates to correspond with the interstate
rates; however the action of the Commission should be directed
to a substantial disparity against, and destruction of, interstate
commerce, and must leave appropriate discretion to the state
authorities to deal with intrastate rates, as between themselves,
on the general level which the Interstate Commerce Commission
has found to be fair to interstate commerce. The "dovetail relation" of the amended section 13 to section 15a is also recognized:
"When we turn to paragraph 4, section 13, however, and find the

Commission for the first time vested with a direct power to remove
'any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate
or foreign commerce," it is impossible to escape the dovetail relation
between that provision and the purpose of 15a."

The Court made further statements in its decision which, in
my opinion, are so closely related to the subject under discussion that they bear quoting:
"Theretofore the control which Congress, thru the Interstate Commerce Commission, exercised, was primarily for the purpose of preventing injustice by unreasonable or discriminatory rates against persons and localities, and the only provisions of the law that inured to
the benefit of the carriers was the requirement that the rates should
be reasonable in the sense of furnishing an adequate compensation for
the particular service rendered, and the abolition of rebates. The new
measure imposed an affirmative duty on the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix rates and to take other important steps to maintain
an adequate railway service for the people of the United States."
"Congress in its control of its interstate commerce system is seeking in the Transportation Act to make the system adequate to the
needs of the country by securing for it a reasonable compensatory
return for all the work it does. The states are seeking to use the
same system for intrastate traffic. That entails large duties and expenditures on the interstate commerce system which may burden it
unless compensation is received for the intrastate business reasonably
proportionate to that for the interstate business. Congress, as the
dominant controller of interstate commerce, may, therefore, restrain
undue limitations of the earning power of the interstate commerce
system in doing state work."
"It is said that our conclusion gives the Commission unified control of interstate and intrastate commerce. It is only unified to the
extent of maintaining efficient regulation of interstate commerce under
the paramount power of Congress. It does not involve general regulation of intrastate commerce. Action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this regard should be directed to a substantial disparity
which operates as a real discrimination against, and obstruction to,
interstate commerce, and must leave appropriate discretion to the
state authorities- to deal with intrastate rates as between themselves
on the general level which the Interstate Commerce Commission has
found to be fair to interstate commerce."
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On the decisions of those cases previous to the Transportation Act, and under the supreme authority of Congress over
interstate commerce the amendments to section 13 were held
valid, and constitutional.
The state of New York attempted to annul and enjoin an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which required
the interstate railroads operating in intrastate commerce in the
state of New York to increase the intrastate rates for the purpose of bringing them to the level of the interstate rates previously fixed by the Commission. The Court ruled that to allow
the intrastate rates to be maintained would discriminate against
interstate commerce because higher rates in the interstate commerce of the state would have to be charged to secure the income provided by section 15a, of the Interstate Commerce Act,
in carrying out the declared Congressional purpose "to provide
the people of the United States with adequate transportation."
This was said to be an "undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination against interstate commerce," which is prohibited
by paragraph 4 of section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
and which the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to
14
remove by fixing intrastate rates for that purpose.
Although the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission was recognized in Arkansas Railroad Commission v.
Chicago, Rock Island and PacificRailroad Co.,' 5 yet a new phase
of the subject was portrayed. The ruling of the Court can best
be expressed in its own language.
"The intention to interfere with the state function of regulating
intrastate rates is not to be presumed. Where there is a serious doubt
whether an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission extends to
intrastate rates, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the state
power. If, as the railroads believed, the Federal Commission intended
to include the intrastate Arkansas rates, it should have tdken action,
thru appropriate application, to remove the doubt by securing an expression by the Commission of the intention to do so."

See also State of Alabama v. United States.16
In Board of Railroad Commissioners of North Dakota v.
Great Northern Railway Company,17 the question involved was
"4 New York v. United, States. 257 U. S. 591; 66 L. Ed. 391.
11274 U. S. 597; 71 L. Ed. 1224.
10279 U. S. 229-73 L. Ed. 675.
17 281 U. S. 412-74 L. Ed. 936.
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the necessity of a preliminary finding of unjust discrimination,
under section 13, by the Interstate Commerce Commission before a ruling on the discrimination by the Court. There the
carrier brought a suit in a district Federal Court to enjoin the
enforcement of an order of the Railroad Commission pending
determination before the Interstate Commerce Commission as to
whether the intrastate rates so prescribed caused an undue or
unreasonable discrimination against interstate commerce in
violation of section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The injunction was granted by the Federal Court, and on appeal to
the Supreme Court, by the Railroad Commission, the Court
unequivocally stated that the Courts will not enjoin the enforcement of an order of a state railroad commission, prescribing
intrastate rates, on the ground that such rates afford an unjust
discrimination until there has been a prior finding of unjust
discrimination by the Federal Commission. The Court said:
"We find no basis for the conclusion that it was the purpose of
Congress to interdict a state rate, otherwise lawfully established for
transportation exclusively intrastate, before appropriate action by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. On the contrary, Congress sought
to provide a more satisfactory administrative procedure which would
elicit the co-operation of the state regulatory bodies, and insure a
full examination of all the questions of fact which such bodies might
raise, before any finding was made in such a case as to unjust discrimination against interstate commerce or any order was entered
superseding the rate authorized by the state."
"A judicial restraint of the enforcement of intrastate rates. altho,
limited to the pendency of proceedings before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, is none the less essentially a restraint upon the power
of the state to establish rates for its internal commerce, a power the
exercising of which in prescribing rates otherwise valid is not subject
to interference upon the sole ground of injury to interstate commerce,
save as Congress has validly provided. Congress has so provided only
in the event that, after full hearing in which the state authorities
may participate, the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that unjust
discrimination is created. Congress forbids the unjust discrimination
thru the fixing of intrastate rates, but entrusts the appropriate enforcement primarily to its administrative agency."

The case of Florida,et al v. United States, decided January
5, 1931,18 arose when the state of Florida, and others, instituted
action in the district Federal Court to restrain that part of an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which dealt with
certain intrastate rates; the order required the carriers to establish rates in intrastate commerce on a level with those prescribed
I 282 U. S. 212-75 L. Ed.........
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by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The question really
presented before the Court was whether the finding, supported
by the evidence, of the Commission were sufficient to sustain its
order. The Court held that the evidence did not support the
findings, and that the order of the Commission could not be
sustained for that reason. In a discussion of the amendments to
section 13, it was said:
"But it is clear that the fundamental purpose of the Congress
in enacting section 13, subdivisions 3 and 4, was to reach intrastate
rates that were found to result in unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. It was not the fact that the rate was affirmatively
prescribed by the state, but that it was maintained, by the state, as
an intrastate rate, and as such was inimicable to the proper interests
of interstate commerce, that led the Congress to give to the Interstate
Commerce Commission express authority to take cognizance of that
rate, and to prescribe the intrastate rate that should be charged
thereafter to remove the discrimination. See Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Great Northern Railway Company, 281 U. S. 412. The
provisions of section 13, 3 for notice to, and conference with, the
authorities of the state, is important not only where the rates have
been prescribed by the state, but also where they are in force with
the permission of the state and, as intrastate rates, would otherwise
be subject to the jurisdiction of the state."

The Court reached its conclusion in the following language:
"The Commission has no general authority to regulate intrastate
rates and the mere existence of a disparity between particular rates
on intrastate and interstate traffic does not warrant the Commission
in prescribing intrastate rates."
"But to justify the Commission in the alteration of intrastate rates,
it was not enough for the Commission merely to find that the existing
intrastate rates on the particular traffic were not remunerative or
reasonably compensatory. The authority to determine the reasonableness per se of intrastate rates lay with the state authorities and not
with the Interstate Commerce Commission. In dealing with unjust
discrimination as between persons and localities in relation to Interstate commerce, the question is one of the relation of rates to each
other. In considering the authority of the Commission to enter the
state field and to change a scale of intrastate rates in the interest of
the carriers' revenue, the question is that of the relation of rates to
income. The raising of rates does not necessarily increase revenue.
It may in particular localities reduce revenue instead of increasing It,
by discouraging patronage."
"The question is not merely one of the absence of elaboration or
of a suitable complete statement of the grounds of the Commission's
determination to the importance of which this Court has recently
adverted . . .. but of the lack of the basic or essential findings
required to support the Commission's order. In the absence of such
findings, we are not called upon to examine the evidence in order to
resolve opposing contentions as to what it shows or to spell out and
state such conclusions of fact as it may permit. The Commission Is
the fact finding body and the Court examines the evidence not to make
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findings for the Commission but to ascertain whether its findings are
properly supported."
"We conclude that the order of the Commission . . . is not
supported by the findings . . . and must be set aside."

From the foregoing discussion, the increased power of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, under the amended section
13, over interstate rates can be seen and followed. Up to the
present time it is apparent that Congress has not exceeded its
authority over interstate commerce in the regulation of intrastate rates. Congress has acted on the principle that. the states
cannot, under any guise, impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce. This is but to say that the states are not permitted directly to regulate or restrain that which, from its
nature, should be under the control of one authority, and be
free from restriction save as it is governed in the manner that
Congress ordains.
This legislation by Congress will, no doubt, prove beneficial
in lessening the number of conflicts between state and Federal
control, and to secure a more uniform system of national commerce for one of the paramount purposes of the Commerce Act
was to secure uniformity. However, it should be remembered
that the attainment of uniformity does not require that in every
case where the construction of a tariff is in dispute, there shall
be a preliminary resort to the Commission; it is only in that type
of case where a rate, rule, or practice is attacked as unreasonable
or unjustly discriminatory that there must be a preliminary resort to the Commission.
Pursuant to the foregoing decisions of the Supreme Court,
construing paragraphs 3 and 4 of section 13, it seems that it is
mandatory for the Commission to hold a "full hearing" and to
thoroughly investigate the rate, or rates, alleged to be discriminatory. Any change of rates by the Commission would affect a
great many persons; the Commissions' action would change the
price of commodities, affect transportation costs, enhance or decrease production, etc. The seriousness and demand for a careful investigation should be considered in the light of the effect
any change in rates will cause. Also the Commission should
carefully examine the facts, and give reasons on which its findings are concluded; this should be done in order to cause the
court no unnecessary work in construing the Commission's
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orders, and will leave the parties in no doubt as to any matter
essential to the case.
"Complete statements by the Commission upon which it's determinations rest are quite as necessary as are opinions of lower courts
setting forth the reasons on which they base their conclusions."'
To this end it is important that the Federal power be not exerted unnecessarily, hastily, or harshly. It is important also that
the demands of comity and courtesy, as well as of the law, be
deferred to. The Supreme Court has emphasized this duty in
several recent cases: Florida,et al v. United States, 282 U. S. 212,
75 L. Ed. -; Lawrence v. St. Louis, San Francisco B. Co., 274
U. S.588, 71 L. Ed. 1219; Baltimore,B. and 0. R. Co. v. United
States, 279 U. S. 781, 73 L. Ed. 954.
At this stage it is hard to point out the line of demarcation
between the rights 'of the various states and the power of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. However, if the Commission carries out paragraphs 3 and 4, of section 13, in the
spirit in which they were enacted, and pursuant to those principles set out by the Supreme Court, there will, no doubt, be a
more unified system of national railways without a serious invasion of state rights.
Louis Cox
Frankfort, Kentucky.
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